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MILITARY POWER IN THE CHRISTIAN ROMAN EMPIRE, ca. 300-1204 
AN INTRODUCTION  
Yannis Stouraitis 
 
‘Don’t allow your army to be broken up or to become poor, or you will become poor 
yourself, and consider yourself very wretched. The army is the glory of the Emperor, 
and the power of the palace. For, if there is no army, the state (Treasury) cannot stand 
firm, but anyone who wants to will by all means oppose you. Endeavour, at all times, 
(to see) that the fleet grows, and that you have it at full strength; for the fleet is the 
glory of the Roman realm.’1 
These lines from the late-11th century so-called Strategikon of Kekaumenos, a treatise written 
by a Byzantine magnate of Asia Minor, provide probably the best point of departure for an 
introduction to the topic of this volume. To begin with, the author’s reference to the current 
realm of Constantinople as Romania makes it clear that the reference to a Byzantine culture of 
war in the title of the current book has little to do with an effort to take sides in a latent 
modern historiographical debate as to where Rome ends and Byzantium begins2. 
Kekaumenos’ solid belief in the continuity of the Roman imperial order in the 11th century 
demonstrates that ‘Byzantium’ as a terminus technicus is – as any other periodicizing concept 
– de facto arbitrary and, therefore, has very little historical value irrespective of its analytical 
purpose3.  
As a result, the here suggested conceptualization of eastern Roman military affairs from 
the 4th to the 12th centuries as Byzantine is intended to serve concrete analytical goals in the 
context of our topic. First, it aims to clarify that the focus of this book will be on the East, that 
is, on those parts of the Christian Roman Empire that were under the centralized authority of 
the imperial-city state of Constantinople, alias New Rome. Second, it is intended to suggest a 
different perspective regarding periodization that puts the continuity of a politically united 
and centralized social order at the epicentre. In other words, it will focus on the role of 
military power and warfare in the endurance of the centralized imperial rule of Constantinople 
                                                
1 Kekaumenos, Consilia et Narrationes, ed. and transl. Charlotte Roueché, (Sharing Ancient Wisdoms 
/ SAWS, 2013), p. 101. 
2 In the present, the term Byzantine Empire is employed either to designate the Roman Empire from 
Constantine I onwards or, more often the Eastern Empire from the sixth century onwards. On two 
different takes on this issue, see indicatively Stathakopoulos, A short history of the Byzantine empire, 
pp. 2-3; Whittow, The Making of Orthodox Byzantium, pp. 96-98. 
3 Cf. Každan/Epstein, Change in Byzantine culture, p. 1. 
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over a fluctuating realm from the foundation of the city by Constantine I in 330 until the 
irreversible political disintegration of the eastern Roman world in the wake of the Fourth 
Crusade (1204).  
So –to return to the initially cited text-passage– Kekaumenos’ utterances are useful 
because they spotlight the crucial role of military power in the longevity of the Roman 
imperial system in the East. In an insightful manner, the Byzantine general presents the 
existence of the high-medieval East Roman state, i.e. the fluctuating borders of the imperial 
power’s enforceable authority4, as relying on the emperor’s ability to maintain firm control 
over a strong army that secured his advantage against anyone willing to resist his power. That 
this statement was equally meant to refer to the army’s role in defending the frontiers of the 
empire as well as in circumscribing the relationship between the imperial center and the 
provinces in the interior is made evident by two things:  
• Kekaumenos employs the word demosios to allude to the state. This term literally 
translates as fiscal authority, i.e. the Treasury, in Byzantine terminology, and its use here 
pinpoints the interdependence between the imperial office’s concentrated military power 
and centralized control over tax revenues.  
• In another part of the text, the provincial magnate demonstrates his awareness that a 
rebellion against the emperor was difficult to succeed due to the evident military 
superiority of the imperial office5. This awareness fully corresponds with the fact that the 
majority of ‘civil wars’ in the imperial realm in the period between the 4th and the late-11th 
century was predominately caused by rebels aiming at the usurpation of the imperial 
office, and had ended with the reigning emperor as the winner of the conflict.  
In this respect, Kekaumenos’ approach to the role of organized military power in his 
own society provides a straightforward answer to the socio-historical question as to whether 
the eastern Roman social order could have endured as a politically united social order without 
standing imperial armies, paid and controlled by the center of imperial power. If the Roman 
Empire had come into being due to the capacity of its legions to re-organize socio-political 
structures in newly occupied territories, the longevity of the imperial system was grounded on 
two basic features that had crystalized during the time of the Principate. The first was the 
integration of provincial élites into the Roman political order, i.e. the process of full-scale 
                                                
4 Haldon, The state and the tributary mode of production, pp. 32–34; cf. Wickham, Framing the Early 
Middle Ages, pp. 56–62, esp. p. 57. On the distinction of the state as an ideal type between modern 
infrastructural and pre-modern despotic, see Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State” 113-116. 
5 Kekaumenos, Consilia et Narrationes, ed. Roueché, pp. 64-76. 
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Romanization of leading elements of the subjugated populations. The second was the imperial 
office’s monopoly of control over military power. This was crucial not only for the defence of 
its frontiers against foreign threats, but also for preventing provincial secession from 
centralized rule. These basic features of the Roman system of territorial empire, i.e. of a vast 
Roman imperial state, from the 1st century A.D. onwards continued to underline its function 
in the medieval eastern Roman Empire after the 5th-century collapse of centralized rule in the 
Western parts where the process of migration of Germanic peoples led to the gradual 
emergence of a post-Roman world of ethnic regna6.  
The extensive territorial contraction of the east Roman realm in the period between 
roughly the late-6th and the late-7th century transformed it into a mini-empire compared to the 
Roman realm under the autocratic rule of Constantine I or to Justinian I’s restored empire of 
the mid-sixth century. Even in its outmost territorial expansion during the early-11th century, 
the medieval realm of Constantinople would never come any close to past glories regarding 
its territorial size. Moreover, the medieval Roman élite underwent a transformation into 
mainly an élite of service highly dependent upon the imperial office for titles and revenues7. 
Even though the basic structure of a hierarchical and centripetal imperial community was 
maintained, one could plausibly argue that, if the Late Roman Empire had mainly been an 
agglomeration of self-governed cities, in the wake of the radical transformation of the late-
antique urban landscape the imperial realm of Constantinople was transformed into an 
agglomeration of large territorialized military commands by the early-8th century. In the initial 
phase, these were large areas of assignment (strategiai) of the military forces of a strategos 
(general) in Anatolia along with some smaller commands in the few remaining Western 
outposts. From roughly the early-9th century onwards, these developed into themata, smaller 
administrative and military units under a military commander8. From the late-tenth century 
on, the latter were subordinated to larger commands named doukata or katepanata9. These 
underwent significant changes after the radical territorial contraction in the East in the late-
11th century. 
                                                
6 Goffart, Barbarian Tides; Heather, The fall of the Roman Empire; Halsall, Barbarian migrations and 
the Roman West. 
7 Haldon, “Social Élites, Wealth, and Power”, pp. 179f. 
8 On these developments, see Zuckerman, “Learning from the enemy and more” 125f.; Cheynet , “La 
mise en place de thèmes” 1-14; Brubaker/Haldon, Byzantium in the Iconoclast Era, pp. 723-755, esp. 
744f. 
9 Kühn, Die byzantinische Armee, pp. 123-69 
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The transition to an apparently more militarized model of society has plausibly been 
associated with the urgent need to confront the swift expansion of Islam in the course of the 
7th century. For roughly one century (640s to 740), the Muslim armies threatened the very 
existence of Constantinople’s realm, whereas the Caliphate continued to represent the 
empire’s major rival until the late-10th century, thus playing an important role in the 
configuration of its medieval image. Nonetheless, the socio-political traits of the process of 
militarization in the interior need to be revisited in the light of the latest research findings 
regarding the so-called themata-system. The revisionist approaches to the older theories about 
a mid-7th century imperial reform, according to which the themata were introduced as new 
military and administrative units, demonstrate that one also needs to revisit those older 
historiographical schemes which promoted, implicitly or explicitly, a romantic interpretation 
of the fundamental role of the thematic forces, as quasi-national armies of peasant-militia, in 
the empire’s survival.10  
Current wisdom emphasizes the continuation of the late Roman military and 
administrative structures during the period of the Muslim expansion, and points to a process 
of gradual change of eastern Roman military structures. This process was triggered by the 
shock of defeat and the territorial contraction in the East in the mid-7th century. Nonetheless, 
it was informed by the principles of Roman statecraft, i.e. of centralized imperial authority, 
when it took the form of well-directed reform measures by the emperors from roughly the 
mid-8th century onwards. These measures reveal the imperial power’s concern to maintain 
control over standing field armies of full-time (professional) recruits. This means that, if the 
7th century process of militarization refers primarily to the revived role of the army and high-
ranking military officers, the strategoi – as the main bearers of imperial authority in the 
provinces – in political affairs,11 it cannot be simply explained as the outcome of an 
emergency reaction to Islamic expansionism. It also needs to by analyzed in the broader 
context of the function of military power as a central organizational means in the system of 
empire.  
If one looks at the development of the 7th-century crisis from the late-630s onwards, the 
localization of defence as well as the localization of recruitment in the areas of assignment of 
the magistri militum with their armies in Asia Minor were processes that went along with an 
evident regression of Byzantine efficiency on the battlefield. The radical regression of state-
revenues due to the loss of Egypt and the eastern provinces seems to have had a negative 
                                                
10 Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, p. 106; Ahrweiler, L’ideologie politique, pp. 29-36. 
11 Haldon, The Empire that would not die, pp. 147f.  
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impact on the quality of equipment and the efficiency of a significant part of the provincial 
forces in the period from the late-7th to the late-8th centuries.12 More importantly, though, 
these processes begot a tendency of decentralization of power within the imperial system in 
the context of regionally focused defence. They de facto provided the generals that 
commanded the regional armies with much more space for autonomy in regard to both control 
over their forces as well as over the revenues of the latter’s regions of assignment, and in part 
also of their warring activity.   
If these developments point to a loosening of those structural conditions that enabled the 
imperial office to maintain firm control over concentrated military power, one needs to ask 
why this did not cause the collapse of the imperial system in the face of tremendous external 
pressure from the Muslim foe roughly between the mid-7th and the mid-8th centuries. The 
first answer to come to mind is, of course, the complete ideological adherence of the 
Romanized provincial élites of Asia Minor to the vision of empire, which had been decisively 
underpinned by the homogenizing religious discourse of Christian monotheism since the late-
4th century. Despite the evident decentralization of military power between the mid-7th and the 
mid-8th centuries, the loyalty of the Anatolian military élite to the imperial office of 
Constantinople led the generals to make use of their soldiers’ loyalty to their person only to 
reproduce the system of empire by rebelling as usurpers against the reigning emperor – not to 
seek the system’s disintegration through secession. 
However, an overemphasis on the role of an operative ideology or, for that matter, 
common identity, religious or political (or both), as the main factor that determined the 
survival of the imperial system would only provide a reductionist – and therefore incomplete 
– explanation.13 The role of a religious proto-ideology that underpinned the role of the 
institutional charisma of the Roman imperial office of Constantinople in keeping the empire 
together should, of course, not be underestimated. What seems to have played an equally – if 
not even more – important role, though, is the very nature of the enemy that threatened the 
existence of the imperial system from without. The character of the Muslim offensive, which 
was informed by an apocalyptic religious ideology of ‘holy war’14 and which is usually 
regarded as one of the principal reasons that should have caused the empire to collapse, 
should rather be seen as one of the main reasons that forced military élites in Anatolia to stick 
                                                
12 A good overview of these processes in Haldon, “Military Service”, 11-41. 
13 Cf. the latest comprehensive analysis in Haldon, The Empire That Would Not Die, pp. 79-158. 
14 Cook, Understanding Jihad, pp. 19-25; Blankiship, The End of the Jihâd State, pp. 11-23.  
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together and maintain their loyalty to the centralized rule of the imperial city-state of 
Constantinople. 
Both the crisis of the 5th century in the western part of the Roman Empire as well as that 
of the long 12th century in the core territory of the Byzantine Empire in Anatolia, represent 
useful examples of the opposite case that can help us make the aforementioned point clear. A 
macro-structural approach to both aforementioned cases indicates that the foreign enemy did 
not appear in the shape of an emerging centralized imperial culture that pursued a frontal 
clash with the Roman order in order to knock it down and replace it with a new one. The 
infiltration of migrating peoples in the fifth-century West and Turkish groups in eleventh-
century Anatolia respectively – albeit their evident differences – equally refer to phenomena 
of penetration and destabilization, both in military-territorial as well as politico-cultural 
terms,15 of two imperial orders that were witnessing internal structural tensions. Thus, the 
collapse of centralized imperial rule was brought about rather as a process of transformation 
which – as violent as it may have been – it occurred as the combined result of the imperial 
office’s diminishing military power as well as of the enemy’s ability to permeate the 
established order and create conditions of coexistence and/or fusion with existing power 
structures at a regional level. This process left space for local bearers of power to be partly 
accommodated either within the emerging new power structures or beside them in a new 
power-political context.  
Conversely, the Muslim offensive of the 7th century – especially in its form after the 
establishment of the Umayyad dynasty from 661 onwards– referred to a rising imperial 
power’s endeavour to eliminate the Christian-Roman order in order to replace it. The vision 
of imposing the Koran’s uncompromising monotheism under the centralized rule of the 
successor of the Prophet, the Caliph, dictated a process of subjugation and substitution, 
instead of penetration and transformation, of existing orders as the swift conquest and 
disintegration of the Sassanid Empire had made evident. Even though the early ‘Community 
of the Believers’ had a tolerant attitude towards other monotheistic populations, thus 
facilitating the swift accommodation of the eastern – largely Monophysite – Christian 
                                                
15 On the process of so-called ‘barbarization’ of the Roman army in the Empire, see Liebeshuetz, 
Barbarians and bishops, pp. 7-85. On the political and cultural coexistence of Turks and Romans in 
Asia Minor from the late-eleventh century onwards, see Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, pp. 202-15; 
Ducellier, Chrétiens d’Orient et islam, pp. 260-75; Balivet, Romanie byzantine et pays de Rûm turc, 
pp. 30-39, 47-53; Balivet, “Entre Byzance et Konya”, pp. 47-79; Necipoğlou, “The Coexistence of 
Turks and Greeks in Medieval Anatolia” 58-76; Beihammer, “Defection across the Border of Islam 
and Christianity” 597-651; idem, Byzantium and the Emergence of Muslim-Turkish Anatolia. 
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monotheists under the rule of the first three so-called orthodox Caliphs,16 its territorial 
expansion was a process of violent military conquest aiming at the elimination of 
neighbouring political orders.17 Integration into the early Muslim political order meant that 
the members of the local élites in the conquered provinces should either abandon their places 
or stay and – as a rule – accept accommodation in the new religious-political system with a 
marginal or subordinate social and political position.18  
If the latter process was facilitated in the eastern provinces by the recent experience of 
Persian rule, which had contributed to the regression of the local élites’ belief in the 
inevitability of Roman rule and had caused a renegotiation of their bonds with the political 
centre of Constantinople,19 the case was not the same with the élites of Asia Minor. These had 
longstanding vested interests in the centralized Roman imperial system and were 
predominately Trinitarian Christians, that is, bearers of a monotheistic identity that was even 
less compatible than that of Monophysites or Jews with uncompromising Muslim 
monotheism.20 Moreover, the conditions of the military clash after the mid-7th century 
between two centralizing systems of rule with superior military power made any attempt of 
provincial secession from Constantinopolitan authority on the Anatolian periphery doomed to 
fail. This reality left the members of provincial élites – especially the military élite – in the 
empire’s Anatolian territorial core with little alternative choice but to remain loyal and seek to 
defend their status by defending the empire. 
Therefore, for the Byzantine success in stopping the Muslim advance in Asia Minor, 
besides other factors – such as issues of changing military tactics on the Byzantine side as 
well as political dissension within the Caliphate roughly from the mid-7th century onwards – 
one needs to consider the role of the nature of the Muslim threat in eliciting a higher level of 
socio-political cohesion and loyalty in the course of the conflict, thus contributing to the 
preservation of Constantinopolitan control over Asia Minor.21 It follows that the nature of the 
Muslim offensive should be seen as both a cause for the emerging decentralization of military 
power within the imperial system between the mid-7th and the mid-8th centuries, and a crucial 
factor that counterbalanced this intrasystemic tension. In this period, provincial élites – in 
                                                
16 Donner, Muhammad and the Believers, pp. 106-118. 
17 Hoyland, In God’s Path, pp. 63-64, 135-6. 
18 Hoyland, In God’s Path, pp. 158-61. 
19 Whittow, “The late Roman/early Byzantine Near East”, pp. 94-95. 
20 On resistance to the Islamic expansion, see Haldon, The Empire That Would Not Die, pp. 159-214. 
21 The same can be said, to a certain extent, for Kushrō II’s war of annihilation against the empire in 
the reign of Heraclius (610-641). On this war see the detailed account in Kaegi, Heraclius, pp. 58-191. 
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particular the generals of the settled provincial armies – may have found themselves in an 
advantageous position compared to the power élite in Constantinople in terms of political and 
military power within the system of empire, but the Muslim threat led them to use this 
advantage almost exclusively towards the defence and reproduction of this system.  
By comparison, the process of regression of centralized control over the largest part of 
Anatolia in the late-11th century was the combined result of two things: On the one hand, 
internal political-military dissension and tendencies of decentralization impaired the imperial 
power’s potential to properly reorganize its military forces and maintain centralize hold on the 
territory and its revenues – in particular after 1071. On the other, it needs to be related to the 
nature of the Turkish penetration, the primary phase of which had begun already since the 
1140s on the eastern frontier. The Turkish settlement was not the result of a frontal offensive 
by a rival centralized imperial order that aimed to knock down the empire of 
Constantinople.22 The various Turkish groups – even though under the nominal overlordship 
of the Seljuk sultan – penetrated Anatolia individually, partly also as allies of Byzantine 
magnates in the latter’s conflicts over the throne, and took advantage of the central power’s 
military weakness in order to establish a number of autonomous principalities there.23    
As a result, the Seljuk settlement became one of the main factors that contributed to the 
escalation of the phenomenon of provincialism and separatism in the course of the long 12th 
century. The role of this process in depriving the imperial office of important revenues and 
human resources – as the main means for maintaining strong field armies – pinpoints the 
interrelation between centralized control over superior military power and the maintenance of 
provincial loyalty to the imperial office of Constantinople, i.e. to the system of empire. In this 
period, the incremental tendency of Byzantine provincial magnates to defy the rule of 
Constantinople and create semi-autonomous or autonomous regimes in their regions was 
facilitated by the mediocre military strength of both the imperial office as well as the Turkish 
principalities, its main enemy in Anatolia.  
The here attempted comparison of the Arab-Muslim and the Seljuk invasions on a 
macro-structural level – even though it hardly does justice to the complexity of these diverse 
and multifaceted historical phenomena – is intended to spotlight the dialectic relationship 
between military power, intrasystemic contradictions and external pressures in a medieval 
social order circumscribed by the political discourse of empire. It is in this context that one 
                                                
22 On the process of Turkish interpenetration of Byzantine territories and socio-political structures, see 
Beihammer, Byzantium and the Emergence of Muslim-Turkish Anatolia, pp. 169-304.    
23 Cahen, “La première pénétration turque en Asie Mineure” 5-67; Beihammer, Byzantium and the 
Emergence of Muslim-Turkish Anatolia, pp. 198-243. 
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should seek to approach the development of medieval Roman military structures from roughly 
the mid-8th century onwards. The first well-directed military reform of this period, the 
reorganization of the imperial regiments (basilika tagmata) under Constantine V (741-775) 
sometime around the mid-8th century,24 was principally associated with internal affairs and 
had little to do with the war against the Muslims. The emperor’s initiative to reinstitute an 
élite force of two regiments (scholae, excubitores) under his direct command and to divide the 
opsikion, the military command in Constantinople’s Asiatic hinterland, into three minor 
commands was the first response of the imperial office to the aforementioned process of 
decentralization of military power since the mid-7th century. This process had nearly cost 
Constantine V his throne due to the revolt of the military commander of the Opsikion 
Artabasdos shortly after he had succeeded his father Leo III.  
The existence of an élite force directly attached to the imperial office had many 
implications. Given that this was initially an arithmetically rather small corps and, therefore, 
could not campaign individually against the enemies of the empire, its primary purpose was to 
circumscribe the loyalty of the provincial armies. By creating an armed force under the direct 
control of the imperial office, the emperor ensured that, if one of his generals decided to 
attempt a rebellion of usurpation, he would not be exclusively dependent on the interests and 
loyalty of the other generals and their armies in order to defend Constantinople and his 
regime. Nevertheless, if this reform originally stemmed from Constantine V’s need to readjust 
the internal political scene in terms of dynastic stability (i.e. to discourage movements of 
usurpation against him), in the long-run it was meant to have a major impact on the endurance 
of the eastern Roman imperial system.  
The timing of the reform coincided with the end of the so-called ‘jihad-state’ in the 
Caliphate through the transition of power from the Umayyad to the Abbasid dynasty and the 
transfer of the capital from Damascus to Bagdad.25 By sealing the end of the period of 
Muslim onslaughts against Constantinople – a conducive development for the transition of the 
clash between the Empire and the Caliphate from a war of annihilation to a frontier conflict of 
attrition – the fall of the Umayyads triggered a process that gradually led to the 
decentralization of power within the vast Caliphate. It follows that Constantine V set in 
motion a policy that aimed to restore the imperial office’s centralized control over superior 
military power in the interior, when the intensity of the Muslim offensive began to wane and a 
                                                
24 The first mention of the tagmata in the sources refers to the year 765; On this reform see Haldon, 
Byzantine Praetorians, pp. 228f. 
25 Blankiship, The End of the Jihâd State, p. 3. 
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process of destabilization of centralized rule in the Caliphate was about to set in. From that 
time onwards, the gradual regression of Muslim superiority on the battlefield would go along 
with military measures that aimed at reinstating the military supremacy of the imperial office 
within the imperial system. 
The imperial tagmata, apart from their leading role in the implementation of imperial 
policies in the interior, acquired incrementally the role of an élite force on the battlefield. The 
rising importance of these units is reflected in the effort of the emperors that succeeded 
Constantine V to maintain firm control over them by adding new units to the initial two. In 
this context, it is of particular importance that emperor Nikephoros I (802-811) who 
introduced a fourth unit (Hikanatoi), thus giving the imperial regiments there final shape, was 
the emperor that founded the so-called thematic system.26 A better understanding of the 
qualitative traits of the military reform that this emperor instigated needs to take into account 
that he was keen on relying his power on élite units of full-time recruits. This is further 
demonstrated by the relocation of the regiment of the foederatoi from the command of the 
Anatolikon to the capital during his reign.  
Nikephoros I – an experienced court official before his rise to the throne – introduced a 
fiscal measure that made the community of the village, as a fiscal unit, collectively 
responsible for supporting its recruited members that could not bear the cost of military 
equipment. This reform was obviously intended to deal with the problem of providing the 
army with well-equipped recruits – a persistent problem since the 7th-century crisis that had 
influenced the efficiency of the provincial armies on the battlefield. It follows that the 
emergence of the so-called theme-system in the course of the 9th century was the product of a 
well-directed fiscal reform concerning the system of centrally controlled recruitment. The 
principal motive behind this reform was not to create an army model of part-time peasant-
militia bound to the defence of their region. It was rather to ensure the financial viability of 
well-equipped recruits in the provincial armies. This is made evident by the instructions 
concerning recruitment to the thematic forces provided in the Tactica of Leo VI. This military 
treatise was written in the beginning of the 10th century when the thematic system had taken 
its full shape after a series of consequent actions in this direction by successive emperors in 
the course of the 9th century. According to the author of the text, the general of the thema 
should recruit his men only from those households registered for military service that were 
                                                
26 Haldon, “A context for two “evil deeds”, pp. 245-266. 
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well-off, because these men would be capable of devoting themselves full-time to 
soldiering!27 
The consistent reorganization of imperial territories into themata by the emperors of the 
9th century, which multiplied the number of generals and commands in Asia Minor in 
comparison to the older system of the strategiai,28 points to another important power-political 
aspect of this reform. The upgrading of the administrative role of the general in the region 
under his military jurisdiction concluded the process of the imperial administration’s 
militarization. At the same time, however, it decisively reduced the individual military power 
of the commanders of the provincial armies. Constantine V’s initiative against the tendency of 
decentralization of military power in the mid-8th century was taken a step further by the 
emperors of the 9th century and was completed through the fragmentation of all large military 
commands (strategiai) into smaller themata. These were now administrative units in which 
the general disposed political authority as well.  
In light of this, one could plausibly argue that the 9th-century thematic reform was the 
climax of a reforming process that had started in the mid-8th century. The main political 
rationale behind this process was to increase the imperial army’s efficiency on the battlefield 
as well as to restore the imperial office’s strong hold on superior military power within the 
system of empire, as the main organizational means that circumscribed its coherence. By 
shrinking the individual military power of provincial generals in the course of the 9th century, 
the imperial power consolidated the leading role of the imperial tagmata and other emerging 
élite units under the direct control of the power élite in Constantinople. This meant that the 
charismatic power of the imperial office was once again guarantied from within the system of 
empire in a period when the process of disintegration of centralized Muslim rule in the vast 
Caliphate was reaching its climax. At the same time, a class of landowning magnates was 
taking its full shape out of the Byzantine élite of service in the provinces.29   
As a result of these developments, the empire was stable and militarily strong enough 
again from the late-9th century onwards to antagonize and gradually to supersede its Muslim 
rival as the dominant military power in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the interior, the leaders 
of the imperial tagmata – usually the domestikoi of the scholai who often headed the whole 
imperial field army on behalf of the emperor – became main bearers of political power 
                                                
27 Leonis VI Tactica, IV 1, ed. G.T. Dennis, The Taktika of Leo VI: text, translation, and commentary, 
Washington, D.C. 2010, p. 46, 5-11.  
28 On the division of the empire in numerous thematic units by the late-9th century cf. the table in 
Haldon, Warfare, p. 86. 
29 See Haldon, “The army and the economy”, 136-38.  
 12 
alongside the leading officers of the imperial fleet. These high-ranking officers were mostly 
members of the provincial landowning families that claimed a share in the hegemonic Roman 
power discourse through their leading positions in the army.  
The fact that access to military power was mainly a matter of proximity to the emperor 
and the court in Constantinople circumscribed the relationship between the imperial office 
and the landowning provincial élite. This is made evident if one takes a look at the large-scale 
civil wars caused by members of the landowning military aristocracy during the 10th century. 
These were mainly aimed at the usurpation of imperial rule, not at secession from the imperial 
state. Τhe rebels were able to materialize their plans only due to their offices that provided 
them with access to the imperial system’s military resources, the standing field armies; not as 
independent warlords relying on their own economic power and human resources. 
Within this framework, 10th-century imperial legislation for the protection of small 
landowners – in particular those with a hereditary obligation of military service – pinpoints 
the emergence of a new intrasystemic threat to the system’s balance. The concentration of 
landed property in the hands of provincial magnates, many of whom were members of the 
élite of service, did not provide them with individual means – in particular personal military 
retinues – that could counterbalance the military resources of the imperial system. 
Nonetheless, it threatened to potentially undermine the fiscal foundations of centralized 
recruitment. The so-called powerful (dynatoi)30 that usually enjoyed a privileged status of tax 
exemptions were in position to buy off the land of small independent peasants. Moreover, 
such impoverished peasants often sought for the protection of a landlord in order to avoid the 
heavy burdens of centralized taxation.31 In the long-term, this threatened to reduce the 
economic resources through which the imperial power was able to finance standing imperial 
armies of full-time recruits and foreign mercenaries.  
The normative aspect of the legislation for the protection of small landholders reflects, 
therefore, a developing stand-off between the landowning élite of service and the imperial 
office, which threatened the preservation of centralized control over the extraction of surplus. 
The recurrent promulgation of relevant laws in the course of the 10th century indicates that the 
imperial power was hardly in position to effectively implement such legislation. It follows 
that it was not legislative measures but rather expansionary warfare that provided a temporary 
solution to this emerging intrasystemic tension. The revenues of reconquered areas in the East 
and the Balkans widened the central government’s base of tax-resources. The case of the 
                                                
30 Morris, “The powerful and the poor”; Neville, Authority, 68-9, 79f. 
31 Kaplan, “The Producing Population”, p. 152. 
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kouratores in the eastern provinces points to the imperial power’s concern to secure direct 
control over the revenues of newly acquired regions.32  
The imperial office’s thriving economic resources continued to guaranty the loyalty of 
standing armies of full-time indigenous and foreign recruits and, as a result, to circumscribe 
the imperial throne’s charismatic appeal to the powerful members of the military élite. The 
large-scale civil war between the leading army officer Bardas Phokas and emperor Basil II 
(987-989) is indicative. The rebel was clearly in command of the largest and stronger part of 
the indigenous field army units and controlled a large part of Anatolia, when he set out to 
occupy Constantinople and the imperial throne. The emperor was in position, however, to use 
the resources of the imperial treasury to hire a strong mercenary force of Varangians. This 
action proved crucial for the final outcome of the civil war in his favour. Thereafter, the 
Varangian guard became the imperial office’s main élite force – an imperial guard of foreign 
mercenaries loyal to their employer, the emperor of Constantinople.    
It is in this light that the slow process of disintegration of the imperial system that set in 
from roughly the mid-11th century onwards should be examined33. The older mainstream 
thesis attributed the loss of Anatolia to the Turks to the deterioration of the thematic armies of 
part-time peasant militia and their replacement by standing field armies of mercenaries 
(mainly foreign, but also indigenous). This approach overlooked the fact that mercenaries, i.e. 
full-time recruits, were in principle more efficient than peasant-militia on the battlefield.34 
Moreover, it hardly appreciated the evidence showing that it was the re-organization of 
standing armies of full-time recruits that had made the empire militarily powerful again in the 
previous centuries, thus facilitating the large-scale expansion of the 10th century. All this 
indicates that the loss of Anatolia in the aftermath of Mantzikert (1071) to various Turkish 
groups cannot be attributed to the decline of the army-model of peasant-soldiers. Just like the 
conspicuous failure of the Arab armies to accomplish the same task four centuries earlier had 
nothing to do with a centrally-directed reform that created such an army model.  
In this regard, the role of the so-called thematic system as the alleged backbone of the 
empire’s survival and revival in the Middle Ages needs to be soberly revaluated. In the 7th-
                                                
32 On the debate as to whether the kouratoria referred to a system that turned land in the reconquered 
regions into crown estates or whether they referred to a new administrative position that guarantied the 
collection of tribute for the imperial office in these regions, see Oikonomidès, “L’évolution de 
l’organisation administrative” 137; Kaplan, Les hommes et la terre, 316f.; Howard-Johnston, “Crown 
Lands” 75-100; Holmes, “How the East was won”, p. 47. 
33 Haldon, Warfare 90-93. 
34 Haldon, “Approaches to an alternative military history”, pp. 69-70. 
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century, the well-directed withdrawal and dispersal of the imperial armies in Anatolia by the 
emperors of the Heraclian dynasty created a solid military network of in-depth defence, which 
in combination with other factors eventually stopped the Muslim advance. The establishment 
of the themata in the course of the 9th century maintained and strengthened the in-depth aspect 
of the military organization by institutionalizing the system of regional/local recruitment. It 
was out of this reform that the standing field units of the provincial tagmata emerged from the 
early-10th century onwards. By the end of this century, the new military-administrative units 
of doukata or katepanata relied on joined field armies from the imperial and the provincial 
tagmata. This system adopted an outward (offensive) focus by removing the bulk of the 
empire’s military forces to a broad frontier zone.35 The result of these developments was a 
growing military marginalisation of the thematic units in the empire’s inland that led to the 
negligence of the structures of local recruitment there. Moreover, the new system relied more 
on the individual ability of the head of the army and his subordinates for the successful 
defence of large-invading armies.36 
In this context, the civil war over the throne that followed the battle of Mantzikert 
(1071) was conducive for Constantinople’s failure to reorganize its standing forces and 
concentrate them on regional defence in the aftermath of a defeat that had by no means 
disintegrated the imperial army.37 As a result, the imperial office gradually lost control over a 
large part of the Anatolian core territory, its revenues and human resources. This gave birth to 
a vicious circle in the years to come, since the reduced military power of Constantinople did 
not allow for a rash restoration of imperial control over the lost core areas. This determined 
the moderate military potential of the imperial city-state of Constantinople throughout the 12th 
century. The main bulk of the Komnenian imperial armies were élite units of foreign 
mercenaries. The latter were incrementally complemented by some indigenous units from the 
late reign of Alexios I Komnenos onwards as well as by the retinues of the imperial family’s 
relatives and clients. The imperial office’s need to retrieve the necessary military power in 
order to face the Turkish danger triggered the emergence of the crusading movement in 
western Europe.38 Alexios I’s diplomatic quest for contingents of foreign knights that would 
help him repulse the increasing Turkish pressure and restore control over Asia Minor 
unleashed an expansionary vision of ‘holy war’ in the West, which proved a major threat to 
the Byzantine imperial system in the long-term.  
                                                
35 Oikonomidès, “L’organisation de la frontière orientale”, pp. 73-90. 
36 Haldon, “Approaches to an alternative military history”, pp. 62-65. 
37 Cheynet, “Manzikert” 412-34. 
38 Shepard, “Cross-purposes”, pp. 107-29; cf. Frankopan, The First Crusade, pp. 87-100. 
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The inherent contradiction of priorities between the Byzantine political vision of 
restoring imperial authority in Asia Minor and the Crusader vision of re-conquering 
Christianity’s Holy Land determined the course of the First Crusade and the emergence of the 
so-called Crusader States in the East. Even though the empire took advantage of Crusader 
advancement in Anatolia in order to recover its authority over parts of western and southern 
Asia Minor, the re-stabilization of the imperial system took place in a new geopolitical 
context, in which the mini-empire of Constantinople was constantly under pressure from both 
the Turks in the East and the Normans in the West. The recurrent Crusades to the Holy Land 
posed a threat to the empire’s security while the Crusader States undermined the Byzantine 
emperor’s position as supreme Christian ruler in the East. 
Within this framework, the consolidation of the so-called Komnenian system enabled 
the Constantinopolitan power élite to remain faithful to the Roman imperial tradition that 
determined the priorities of its internal and foreign policies.39 The creation of a new ruling 
élite consisting of the relatives and the clients of the Komnenoi family counterbalanced the 
fact that, contrary to the previous period, imperial rogai stopped being the main means that 
bound the members of the ruling élite to the imperial office. The extended Komnenian 
network of kinship alongside the imperial office’s control over standing forces of foreign 
mercenaries secured temporarily the relative cohesion of the imperial system insofar as a 
competent warrior-emperor held the throne. The first three Komnenian emperors managed to 
keep movements of provincial secession under control due to their ability to personally lead 
the army with success on the battlefield. Moreover, they conducted small-scale expansionary 
warfare in East and West, which was equally directed against Christian and non-Christian 
enemies. It was reasons of imperial ideology and power politics that second-ranked the goal 
of re-conquering the whole of Anatolia from the infidel Turks.  
The short power vacuum after Manuel I’s death (1180) and the consequent turmoil 
caused by Andronikos I Komnenos short reign were conducive for the further weakening of 
the imperial office’s diminishing military power and charismatic appeal. This triggered the 
culmination of the phenomenon of provincial secession in the last quarter of the 12th century. 
The Angeloi emperors did not manage to keep the centrifugal forces under control in the face 
of increasing pressures from both the Turks in Asia Minor as well as the Normans and the 
Crusaders from the West. The sack of Constantinople by the armies of the Fourth Crusade in 
1204 was the climax of a long and multi-faceted process that determined the imperial 
system’s irreversible disintegration. It may rightfully be asserted that this event marked the 
                                                
39 Magdalino, The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos, pp. 228-266. 
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end of imperial Romanness as an operative ideology that had circumscribed the political unity 
of large parts of the Eastern Mediterranean under the centralized rule of the Roman imperial 
office since the time of Augustus. 
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